This paper investigates the relation between director compensation structure and shareholder interests in the context of acquisitions. Our evidence suggests that acquirer firms that compensate their directors with a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation have significantly higher stock returns around the announcement. Compared to acquirers in the low equity-based compensation group, acquirers in the high equitybased compensation group outperform by 9.54% in a five-day period surrounding the announcement date. These results hold even after controlling for endogeneity issues. We further find that acquirers with higher equity-based pay exhibit greater improvements in stock price and operating performance in the three-years following acquisitions. An increase in director equity-based pay also results in a lower acquisition premium for targets. These results indicate that equity-based compensation provides incentives for directors to make decisions that meet the interests of shareholders.
Introduction
Nowadays, more than eight decades after the Berle and Means (1932) ' pioneering discussion of the modern corporation, executive compensation is still one of the most debated topics in corporate finance. This question is probably even more important today given the major changes occurring in the economy and the protests from several constituent groups to focus more attention on this issue. Besides executive compensation, directors' pay has gradually received more and more attention over the past few years, especially after the Enron and Worldcom scandals and the resulting Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002.
Over the last years, the level of director compensation has increased substantially.
For example, among S&P 1500 firms, the total remuneration per director increased from $35 thousand in 1996 to $190 thousand in 2014. The increase in the level of director compensation is largely due to an increase in director equity-based pay, as the value of stock and options granted to directors soared from less than $9 thousand to near $109 thousand during the same period.
Also, acquisitions may present a particular setting in which equity-based compensation can help strengthen director effort. For example, an increase in directors' equity ownership (via new stocks and/or option grants) may provide directors with direct incentives to engage in active oversight, which can alleviate agency problems. As a consequence of such improved oversight, directors would approve only value-enhancing acquisitions and prevent managers from engaging in bad ones, which may lead to higher acquisition performance.
Acquisitions can also provide directors with opportunities that might exacerbate the potential conflicts of interests between directors and shareholders. Compared with other corporate investment decisions, acquisitions represent a relatively quick way to increase firm size. Given that director compensation is positively associated with firm size (Ryan and Wiggins (2004) and Engel et al. (2010) ), one could reasonably expect such compensation to increase following acquisitions. Moreover, while a decline in stock price might reduce both directors' compensation and wealth, these losses may be offset by potential increases in directors' compensation as acquiring firm's directors may receive new grants of stock and options following acquisitions (see Harford and Li (2007) for evidence on CEO compensa-tion 1 ). Hence, directors desiring a rapid increase in compensation may have strong incentives to approve acquisitions even if they do not serve shareholders' interests.
In view of the conflicting predictions regarding the relation between director compensation and acquisition outcomes, we empirically investigate its direction using a sample of 6840 acquisitions completed by S&P 1500 firms between 1998 and 2014.
First, in an attempt to understand how director equity-based pay affects acquisition decisions, we examine the announcement returns around acquisitions. We show that acquirers with higher equity-based compensation experience higher announcement returns. After controlling for the CEO's equity-based compensation 2 and a wide range of firm and deal characteristics, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the percent of director equity-based pay is associated with an increase of about 2.65% in announcement returns, which corresponds to an increase of $346 million in shareholder value considering an average acquirer market capitalization of $13.06 billion. Additionally, when we split acquirers into three groups based on director equity-based pay, we find that acquirers with high equitybased compensation outperform their counterparts with low equity-based pay by 9.54% in terms of the five-day window surrounding the announcement.
Like in many empirical studies, including our own, there is a possibility that our results are driven by endogeneity. Our analysis provides a number of techniques aimed at thwarting these concerns. For example, in order to alleviate endogeneity problems which may arise when our left and right-hand side variables are jointly determined by potentially unobservable (or uncontrolled for) factors, we employ a two-stage instrumental variables (IV) approach. The results of the 2SLS estimates show that director equity-based compensation continues to have a positive effect on the acquirer's abnormal returns. Moreover, to control for potential endogeneity issues arising from reverse causality, we introduce changes in equity-based compensation (%) as an alternative proxy in our model. The results are once again in line with those presented previously. As a further precaution against potential endogeneity concerns, we include in our models dummy variables to control for industry and 1 Harford and Li (2007) provide evidence that bidding firm CEOs are rewarded with substantial new grants of stock and options after acquisitions. This flow of new grants may offset the negative effect of poor merged-firm stock performance on the CEO's pre-acquisition portfolio and reduce the sensitivity of his/her compensation and wealth to negative stock performance.
2 The CEO's equity-based compensation has been used in order to isolate the effect of director equitybased pay from the effect induced by the CEO's equity-based pay.
year fixed effects, and use robust standard errors.
Second, in order to capture the real economic gains associated with acquisitions, we investigate how director equity-based pay is related to changes in firm performance following acquisitions. Our results reveal that acquirer firms with higher equity-based pay exhibit significant improvements in stock returns, operating performance and efficiency in the 3-years following the acquisition. We also note that these results are robust across the 2SLS method.
Last, to explore the source of acquisition value gains, we examine the offer premiums paid by acquiring firms.
3 Our results suggest that directors with higher equity-based pay are more likely to prevent managers from overpaying for targets. Interestingly, a one standard deviation increase in director equity-based pay reduces the bid premium by approximately 4.77% which translates into considerable savings ($29.6 million) for the average target, whose market capitalization amounts to $620 million. These results clearly show that providing equity-based incentives to outside directors can have a non-trivial effect on shareholders'
wealth.
This study contributes to the literature in an important way. We extend the body of research that highlights the importance of equity-based compensation by providing evidence that the use of incentive-based compensation schemes to reward directors also matters. While prior studies (see, Datta et al. (2001); Minnick et al. (2011) ) find that high managerial equitybased pay leads to improved stock price performance around and following the announcement date of the acquisition, our article yields analogous results using director equity-based pay.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and provides summary statistics. In Section 4, we examine how director equity-based pay affects acquisition decisions.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
3 The acquisition premium is defined as the ratio of the final offer price to the target share price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement, minus one.
Literature review and hypotheses development
Ensuring that managers act in the best interests of shareholders is definitely one of the most important duties of corporate boards. Nevertheless, it has been argued that, instead of acting as stewards of shareholder interests, outside board members may collude with management, which, in turn, may lead to agency problems between directors and shareholders (Fama and Jensen (1983) ). As pointed out by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , such agency concerns can be mitigated through a number of mechanisms, including an increase in equity ownership. Accordingly, equity-based compensation plans can be an effective way to align directors' interests with those of shareholders.
Acquisitions constitute an additional setting that could potentially compromise board members' independence, since acquisitions can provide them with a variety of benefits, especially in the form of higher compensation. Moreover, impaired directors' independence may be harmful for shareholders in the context of acquisitions, because acquisitions are potentially associated with large wealth destruction (Moeller et al. (2004) ). At the same time, incentive-based compensation awarded to directors can increase director effort (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)), which can ultimately translate into value creation. Additionally, the board of directors has a critical role to play in such important corporate decisions as acquisitions (Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Subrahmanyam et al. (1997) ), as directors have a fiduciary responsibility to evaluate investment proposals presented by management to ascertain whether they are in the best interests of shareholders (Weiss (1991) ). Hence, one can reasonably expect the board of directors to have a larger impact on acquisition performance than on the firm's overall performance, which is contingent on a broader set of environmental and organizational factors (Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)).
There is a substantial body of corporate governance literature that focuses on the relation between CEO compensation and corporate acquisitions (see, e.g., Datta et al. (2001) ; Bebchuk and Fried (2003) ; Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and Minnick et al. (2011) ).
Some authors find a positive relation between acquiring managers' equity-based pay and long-run performance following acquisitions (Datta et al. (2001) ), which support the hypothesis that incentive compensation aligns the interests of managers with those of shareholders.
Consistent with this, Minnick et al. (2011) show that incentive-based compensation reduces the likelihood of engaging in value-destroying acquisitions and promotes value-improving acquisitions.
With respect to incentive compensation provided to corporate directors, one may argue that director equity-based pay can also help to align directors' interests with those of shareholders. Given that their stock ownership will increase with equity-based pay, directors will experience in a more direct way the effects of their actions.
Additionally, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that while acquisition decisions that are value-decreasing for shareholders would reduce the value of the current options owned by managers, such acquisitions may raise managers' future compensation by an even larger amount, which can be justified by the increase in firm size. This higher pay might encourage managers to engage in value-destroying acquisitions. In the same vein, Harford and Li (2007) demonstrate that "even in mergers where bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of time". The same authors further argue that, following a merger, acquiring CEOs are rewarded with substantial new option and stock grants, making their total remuneration and overall wealth "markedly" insensitive to performance. These findings complement those of Bliss and Rosen (2001) , who find that CEO pay and wealth typically increase following bank mergers even if the acquirer's stock price falls. Overall, these studies suggest that CEO compensation increases after acquisitions.
Hence, since it has been shown that directors' compensation is positively related to CEO compensation (Brick et al. (2006) ) as well as firm size (Ryan and Wiggins (2004) and Engel et al. (2010) ), it would be logical to expect directors' compensation to increase after acquisitions. If directors anticipate such an increase in their compensation, they may be inclined to ratify acquisitions even if they fail to serve the interests of shareholders.
Sample Selection and Data
This section is partitioned into two parts. The first one describes the sources of data while the second one discusses descriptive statistics for the key variables included in the econometric models.
Sources of data
Data were assembled from several sources. Director compensation data are drawn from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database. From this database, we are able to measure the percent of director equity-based pay that we define as the value of stock and options granted by a firm to an average director, divided by total director compensation. Total director compensation is the average annual compensation that a firm pays each director and is calculated by dividing the total amount that a company pays its board in a given year (total board compensation) by the number of outside directors in that year.
4 To measure total board compensation, we use the sum of annual cash retainer, fees paid to directors for attending board meeting, value of stock grants and value of option awards. We use the Black and Scholes (1973) 5 option valuation model to compute the value of option awards assuming that the strike price is equal to the closing stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year, the time to maturity is 7 years and the risk-free rate is the 7-year Treasury bond yield (item Risk_Free_Rate in ExecuComp). We use the standard deviation of stock prices over 60 months (item BS_Volatility in ExecuComp) and the company's average dividend yield over a 3-year period (item BS_Yield in ExecuComp) in our calculations. 6 The value of stock grants is computed as the number of shares granted multiplied by the closing stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year.
We also gather from this database information on CEO characteristics and compensation. We extract data on board attributes from the RiskMetrics Director Database, financial statement data from the Compustat database. We obtain anti-takeover provision data from the RiskMetrics Governance Database.
After merging the above sources of data, we follow standard practice and exclude financial and utility firms. This leaves us with a final sample of 13,802 firm-years for 1,356
unique firms over the course of our 1998-2014 sample period. We also note that the sample 4 One might suppose that inside (or employee) directors are paid for their service on the board. Nevertheless, this compensation is not separately disclosed and is presumably included in their executive pay and therefore unobservable (Fedaseyeu et al. (2013) ). For convenience purposes, we use the term "director compensation" to refer to outside (or non-employee) director compensation.
5 As modified by Merton (1973) to adjust dividend payouts. 6 We acknowledge that the Black-Scholes model suffers from some limitations, the basic one being that it is based on some unrealistic assumptions. Despite its flaws, the BS model is very useful for approximating the price of an option.
size depends on data availability and therefore varies according to variables used in each regression.
We collect our acquisition sample from the SDC platinum database. The sample covers acquisitions announced by S&P 1500 firms between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2014. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the primary variables used in our analysis.
Summary statistics
The appendix A provides detailed definitions and sources of all variables.
[Insert Table 1 
near here]
The Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the board and CEO characteristics. It indicates that the mean (median) firm in our sample has 8.89 (9) board members. The mean (median) proportion of independent directors is 0.69 (0.73). Additionally, we find that, while boards are dominated by independent directors, there is a relatively large variation among the sample firms, with a standard deviation amounting to 18%. Female directors make up 10% of the board. The average director is 60 years old and has served on the board for 8 years.
We also observe that the CEO and Chairman positions are combined in 56% of firm years.
The mean and median CEO age are both equal to 55. The average CEO tenure is 7.05 years. This panel also presents descriptive statistics on director and CEO compensation for our sample firms. It reveals that the mean equity-based compensation granted to directors (the CEO) is 45.4% (56.7%) of directors' (the CEO's) total compensation. Table 1 reports summary statistics on firm and ownership characteristics.
Panel B of
It shows that our sample firms are fairly large, with a mean value of total assets of $9.32 billion and a mean market capitalization of $13.06 billion. The mean leverage, calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets is 0.183. The mean MTB ratio is 3.93. Panel B also indicates that the percentage of outstanding shares owned by all independent directors is about 1.2%, while CEO ownership averages 3%.
7 We require such deals to meet the following criteria: (a) the transaction is completed; (b) the deal value is greater than $1 million; (c) the acquirer owns at least 50% of the target company after the transaction; (d) the acquirer has director compensation data available from the ExecuComp database one year prior to the acquisition announcement. Applying these criteria, we end up with a sample of 6840 acquisitions Panel C provides summary statistics of variables capturing deal characteristics. It illustrates that the mean transaction value is 13% of the bidder's pre-announcement market capitalization. This is consistent with the findings of Masulis et al. (2007) , who study a sample of acquisitions completed by firms included in the IRRC antitakeover provision database between 1990 and 2003. Moreover, about 13% of the acquisitions in our sample involve publicly traded firms, and 59% involve firms in the same industry. Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for the independent variables used in our multivariate analyses. None of these correlations appears large enough to cause multicollinearity issues for our analyses. Indeed, the highest absolute correlation magnitude between variables is 0.457, which is below the threshold of 0.8 beyond which multicollinearity problems arise.
We find, for example, that the Pearson correlation coefficient between director equity-based compensation and CEO equity-based compensation is 0,34. To double check for any multicollinearity issue, we also perform the Variance-Inflation-Factor (VIF) analyses for all tests.
We find that the highest VIF is 2.06 which is considerably less than the 10 threshold above which multicollinearity could be an issue (see Gujarati (2003)).
[Insert Table 2 near here]
In the next section, we investigate whether the use of equity-based incentives in the compensation packages of directors aligns their interests with those of shareholders in the specific context of acquisitions.
Director equity-based pay and corporate acquisitions
This section is divided into three parts. The first part examines the effect of director equity-based compensation on stock returns accompanying acquisition announcements. The second part investigates how director equity-based pay is related to changes in operating performance after acquisitions while the last part performs some robustness checks.
Announcement stock returns
We compute the acquirer's cumulative abnormal returns over the five-day event window; CAR [-2, 2] , where day 0 denotes the announcement date as reported in the SDC database.
8 The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the standard market model procedure with parameters estimated over a period of 255 days (-301, -46) , preceding the date of announcement.
To investigate the relation between director equity-based pay and acquisition announcement returns, we estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, including year and industry fixed effects, where the dependent variable is the five-day cumulative abnormal returns. Our key explanatory variable is the percent of equity-based compensation for directors, which is defined as the value of stock and options awarded to an average director divided by the total pay. We also control for a wide array of variables identified in prior literature as having significant effects on acquisition returns.
These variables include the acquirer's size, leverage, free cash-flow, the strength of shareholder rights, the target's size relative to the acquirer, the form of payment, whether the bidder and target operate in the same industry, whether the target is a private or a public company, whether the deal is hostile or friendly, board size, board independence, CEO age and tenure, the average age of directors.
In addition, Datta et al. (2001) provide evidence that stock price performance around acquisition announcements is positively related to acquiring managers' equity-based pay.
Therefore, in order to isolate the effect of director equity-based pay from the effect induced by the CEO's equity-based pay, we use the percentage of equity-based compensation for the CEO as well as the fraction of shares held by the latter as additional control variables.
We also include the average director tenure on the board as an additional control variable, as it is reasonable to expect that long-tenured directors have accumulated more specialized knowledge about the firm's business environment and operations (Vafeas (2003) ), and can therefore help managers make better M&A deals. Moreover, motivated by the insights of 8 Given that the announcement dates provided by the SDC database are not always accurate, we follow Cai and Sevilir (2012) and Masulis et al. (2007) , and use a five-day window centered on the announcement date to estimate abnormal announcement returns. Indeed, using a random sample of 500 acquisitions announced from 1990 to 2000 , Fuller et al. (2002 find that the announcement date recorded by SDC was correct at 92.6% of the sample, while it was off by no-more than 2 days in the remaining cases.
earlier studies on the impact of gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance (see, Adams and Ferreira (2009) ; Dowling and Aribi (2013) ; Levi et al. (2014) , among others), we control for the fraction of female directors on the board. Table 3 displays the results of our regressions. In the first column of the table, we use equity-based compensation (%) as our key explanatory variable. In the second column, we divide acquirers, in each year, into two groups based on the equity-based compensation.
"High EBC", "Medium EBC" and "Low EBC" are dummy variables that take the value of one if the acquirer is in the top, middle or bottom third of all firms (acquirers and nonacquirers) in a given year.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
The first column of Table 3 shows that the coefficient on equity-based compensation is positive and significant, suggesting that acquirers with higher equity-based compensation tend to outperform acquirers with low equity-based pay. Moreover, when we divide acquirers into three groups using the equity-based compensation, we observe that the acquirers in the high equity-based compensation group outperform their counterparts with low equity-based compensation group by 9.54% in terms of the five-day period surrounding the announcement.
Moreover, Table 3 indicates that CEO equity-based compensation is negative and significant at the 10% level, indicating that, in order to increase their compensation, CEOs are perhaps inclined to pursue acquisitions even if they fail to serve shareholders' interests.
Performance change after acquisitions
The results obtained so far in this section indicate that firms with higher director equity-based pay have significantly better abnormal returns around the announcement date. Now, to assess the real economic consequences associated with acquisitions, we examine how director equity-based compensation is related to changes in firm performance after the acquisition. To this end, we use the following performance measures. The long-run abnormal stock returns, return on assets as well as an efficiency ratio.
We measure long run abnormal returns using two methods. The first one is the long-run cumulative abnormal returns for each acquiring firm, calculated over a (0, 36) month horizon, as illustrated in the following equation:
where R i,t is the monthly return of a sample firm, R benchmark,t is the monthly return of an appropriately matched control firm. Barber and Lyon (1997) as well as Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that event studies that focus on long-run CARs are misspecified, and identify three reasons to such misspecification, namely, a new listing bias, a rebalancing bias and a skewness bias. Barber and Lyon (1997) document that the test statistics used to evaluate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated using an appropriately matched control firm yields well specified results.
We therefore use the buy-and-hold abnormal returns as an alternative measure to the use of cumulative abnormal returns. To measure the buy-and-hold abnormal returns, we follow the same procedure as in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) . We begin by compounding monthly returns for each acquiring firm over a (0, 36)-month time horizon, to obtain monthly buy-and-hold returns. 10 We then compute buy-and-hold returns of an appropriately matched control firm over the same time period. As a final step, we compute buy-and-hold abnormal returns by subtracting buy-and-hold returns of the benchmark from the buy-and-hold returns of the sample firms, as shown in the following formula:
We compute return on assets as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. We then compute the change in this measure to proxy for the change in operating performance. Changes in return on assets is calculated using quarterly data to more accurately reflect the timing of acquisitions (see also Minnick et al. (2011) ). Specifically, this change is calculated using the difference between return on assets in the first quarter following the completion of the acquisition and twelve quarters later. We also proxy for employee productivity using an efficiency ratio, calculated as total assets divided by the number of full-time employees (see Cornett and Tehranian (1992) ). Given that quarterly data on the number of full-time employees are not available in the compustat database, we use annual data to calculate the change in the efficiency ratio.
The results are tabulated in Table 4 . The dependent variables in the regressions presented in columns 1-4 of this table are the long-run cumulative abnormal returns, and buyand-hold abnormal returns, the change in return on assets and efficiency ratio, respectively.
While our primary explanatory variable of interest is director equity-based compensation (%), we include several control variables that could potentially affect the change on acquirers' performance following acquisitions. We also introduce in these regressions year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
The results indicate that the coefficients on equity-based compensation are positive and significant in all of the four models. We find, for example, that director equity-based compensation is significantly related to the three-year long-run abnormal return (see the first two columns of Table 4 ). The third column of this table also shows that firms with higher director equity-based pay experience a significant increase in their operating performance after acquisitions. These results suggest that high director equity-based pay (%) may benefit not only equity holders but other stakeholders, including creditors, employees, etc. The results reported in the last column of Table 4 also reveal a positive relationship between director equity-based pay and the change in the efficiency ratio, suggesting that higher directors' incentives may also have a positive impact on employee productivity.
Robustness tests and additional analyses
In this subsection, we conduct a number of robustness tests and additional analyses to deal with various economic and econometric issues. The subsection is therefore divided into two parts. In the first part, we attempt to control for endogeneity using several approaches.
The second part investigates whether director equity-based compensation is related to the acquisition premium paid for the target firm.
Estimations that account for endogeneity
A common concern that may plague our empirical work is the question of the possible endogeneity. Thus, before reaching the conclusion that high equity based pay causes higher stock returns around the announcement, we must first address the potential endogeneity
problems. In what follows, we present the results from some approaches aiming to deal with these issues.
Some unobservable (or uncontrolled for) factors might be responsible for both the fraction of director equity based pay and acquisition announcement returns. To tackle this issue, we use a two-stage estimation procedure which enables us to disentangle the effect of director equity-based pay on announcement returns. It has been argued that a firm's managerial pay may "crucially" depend on the compensation provided by competitors in the same industry (Adams et al. (2011) ). Following these authors and extending their line of reasoning, we use the industry median equity-based compensation (%) as an instrumental variable, as a firm's board member compensation may also be affected by the industry.
Our first stage model involves regressing director equity-based pay (%) on the aforementioned instrumental variable along with all other variables listed in Table 3 , while the second-stage model predicts the five-day cumulative abnormal returns using a fitted value from the first stage as an independent variable. The results of the first and second stage regressions are presented in the first and second columns of Table 5 , respectively. The second column of Table 5 shows that director equity-based pay continues to exhibit a positive relation with the acquirer's abnormal returns.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
Moreover, to explore the robustness of our findings concerning the effect of director equity-based compensation on changes in performance after acquisitions, we perform a twostage least squares estimation using the instrumental variable described above, namely, the industry median equity-based compensation (%). The results of the second stage regression are reported in Table 6 . These results are largely consistent with those reported in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 6 near here]
In addition to omitted variable bias, another possible source of endogeneity may stem from reverse causality. To rule out this possibility, we include changes in equity-based pay (%) as an alternative proxy in our model. Hence, if an increase in this measure (i.e., an increase in director incentive alignment) results in higher announcement returns, the effect of equity-based compensation on the five-day cumulative abnormal returns can be interpreted as causal. The results are displayed in Table 7 . The results are once again highly consistent with those presented in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 7 near here]
As a further safeguard against endogeneity arising from reverse causality, we also estimate a model using lagged values of the explanatory variables. The results with lagged variables are shown in Table 8 . These results do not deviate from the outcomes presented in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 8 near here]
Acquisition premiums
Roll (1986) argues that hubris infected managers attempt to maximize value, but overestimate the value of takeovers and ultimately pay too much for target firms. In contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) suggest that managers overpay for targets not because they make valuation mistakes, but rather to derive personal benefits from acquisitions that do not create value for acquiring firm's shareholders. One would therefore expect that if equity-based pay increases directors' monitoring efforts, then directors with higher equity-based compensation may prevent managers from overpaying for targets. To verify this assumption, we investigate the relation between equity-based pay (%) and the acquisition premium, which is calculated as the ratio of the final offer price to the target share price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement, minus one. Table 9 presents estimates from OLS regressions with both industry and year fixed effects, where the dependent variable is the acquisition premium. The main explanatory variable is director equity-based pay. We also include several control variables that are likely to affect the acquisition premium. For example, Moeller et al. (2004) show that larger acquirer pay, on average, higher premiums since large firm managers are more likely to be driven by hubris. We therefore use the natural logarithm of the market capitalization as a proxy for the acquirer size. Officer (2003) argues that premiums in intra-industry deals are larger than those paid in inter-industry mergers. To control for this possibility, we include a dummy variable that equals one if the target and acquirer share the same twodigit SIC code and zero otherwise. In addition, it has been documented that cash financed acquisitions usually have higher premiums than those paid by stock, since target shareholders are expected to be compensated for the immediate tax liabilities associated with cash offers (Savor and Lu (2009) ). To test for this effect, we add a dummy variable: All Cash, that takes the value of one if the deal is entirely paid in cash, and zero otherwise.
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[Insert Table 9 near here]
The first column of Table 9 reveals that the coefficient on director equity-based compensation (%) is negative and significant, indicating that higher equity-based pay is associated with lower acquisition premiums. This is consistent with the findings of Nguyen (2014) who showed that paying a higher proportion of equity-based compensation to directors is positively related to monitoring activity. Furthermore, when we split acquirers into three groups based on director equity-based pay, we find that the negative effect of director equity-based compensation on the offer premium increases monotonically. These results add further cre-
The remaining firm-specific and governance related control variables are motivated by the findings of Alexandridis et al. (2013) ; Chen et al. (2007) ; Cotter et al. (1997) ; Datta et al. (2001) ; ?); Shivdasani (1993) . These variables include the acquirer's leverage, board size, board independence, an indicator variable for whether the board is busy, the entrenchment index, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO duality, CEO ownership, the fraction of equity-based compensation in the CEO pay package, and the fraction of female directors on the board. We also include year and industry fixed effects and use robust standard errors.
dence to the view that equity-based pay is an effective means of aligning directors' interests with those of shareholders.
Conclusion
The principal objective of this paper is to investigate whether equity-based incentives for directors align their interests with those of shareholders in the specific context of acqui-
sitions.
Specifically, we analyze how director equity-based compensation affects the bidders' stock prices around the time of the announcement, the acquisition premium paid for target firms and changes in performance following the acquisition.
Our results provide evidence that firms with higher director equity-based pay experience higher abnormal stock returns around the announcement. On average, acquirers in the high equity-based compensation group outperform their counterparts in the low equity-based compensation group in a five-day window centered on the announcement date.
Furthermore, firms in which directors' interests are better aligned with those of shareholders pay significantly lower acquisition premia. Our results also clearly show that acquirers with higher equity-based compensation exhibit greater improvements in stock price and operating performance following acquisitions, suggesting that various stakeholders benefit, not only shareholders.
In sum, our results indicate that equity-based compensation provides effective motivation for directors to make decisions consistent with value maximization.
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Engel, E., Hayes, R. M., and Wang, X. (2010). Audit committee compensation and the The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies between 1998 and 2014. We employ event study methodology to estimate the market model for each acquisition over a period of 255 days (-301, -46) preceding the announcement date. We then use estimated parameters to calculate the acquirer's cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over a period of five days centered on the event date. The following table shows OLS model estimation results where the dependent variable is the acquirer's five-day cumulative abnormal returns, CAR [-2, 2], around the acquisition announcement. "High Director EBC" and "Medium Director EBC" are dummy variables that take the value of one if the acquirer has Equity-based compensation (%) in the top-or middlethird among all firms in a given year, respectively. The table reports the estimated coefficients and the Absolute t-Statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors. The variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies between 1998 and 2014. The following table reports OLS estimation results where the dependent variables are the long-run cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns, the change in return on assets and efficiency ratio. We compute abnormal returns using a (0, 36)-month window, where month 0 represents the month of the acquisition announcement. We calculate changes in return on assets and the efficiency ratio using a (0, 3)-year window, where year 0 represents the year in which the acquisition is completed. The table presents the estimated coefficients and their t-Statistics. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the estimated coefficients of year and industry dummy variables. The variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Variables
Cumulative Buy-and-hold Return on Assets Efficiency Ratio abnormal returns abnormal returns ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies between 1998 and 2014. The following table reports results from the second stage of the IV 2SLS estimation. The dependent variables, i.e., the long-run cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns, the change in return on assets and efficiency ratio, are regressed on the predicted values of Director EBC derived from the first stage. We compute abnormal returns using a (0, 36)-month window, where month 0 represents the month of the acquisition announcement. We calculate changes in return on assets and the efficiency ratio using a (0, 3)-year window, where year 0 represents the year in which the acquisition is completed. The table presents the estimated coefficients and their t-Statistics. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the estimated coefficients of year and industry dummy variables. The variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 9 : Acquisition premium
The sample is a panel of S&P 1,500 companies between 1998 and 2014. The following table shows OLS model estimation results where the dependent variable is the acquisition premium, defined as the ratio of the final offer price to the target share price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement, minus one. "High EBC" and "Medium EBC" are dummy variables that take the value of one if the acquirer has Equity-based compensation (%) in the top-or middle-third among all firms in a given year, respectively. The table reports the estimated coefficients and the Absolute t-Statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors. The variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Is the average number of years a director has been on the board
Acquisition premium

RiskMetrics DB
Director EBC Is the natural log of (one plus) the annual stock option compensation (measured as per share BlackScholes option value times the number of stock options granted) plus the annual stock compensation (measured as the number of shares awarded times the closing stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year) that a firm pays to an average director, divided by total director compensation
ExecuComp DB E-Index Is defined as the sum of the 6 following provisions (dummy variables): staggered board, poison pills, golden parachutes, limits to shareholders bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments.
Female directors
Is the number of female directors on the board divided by board size
RiskMetrics DB
Firm size Is the natural log of the market capitalization Compustat DB FCF Is free cash flow scaled by total assets Compustat DB Hostile deal Is a dummy variable that equals one if the transaction is classified as hostile in the SDC Platinum database, and zero otherwise
SDC Platinum
Intraindustry
Is a dummy variable that equals one when the target and acquirer share the same two-digit primary SIC code, zero otherwise
SDC Platinum
Investment opportunities
Is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales Compustat DB
Leverage
Is the ratio of total debt to total assets Compustat DB
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of assets
Compustat DB
Number of bidders
Is the number of firms competing to acquire the target
SDC Platinum
Percentage of cash
Is the percentage of the deal value paid in cash by the acquirer
SDC Platinum
Public Target Is a dummy variable that equals one when the target is publicly held, zero otherwise
Relative Size Is the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer's market capitalization at the end of the year prior to the deal
ROA Is the return on assets
